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THE LOST TRANSLATORS OF 1808 AND THE BIRTH OF CIVIL LAW IN
LOUISIANA, by Vernon Valentine Palmer (University of Georgia
Press 2021), ISBN 978-0820358338, 139 pp., $54.95.
I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana’s unique legal system is based on translation. This
book by Vernon Palmer, a professor of law at Tulane University and
a world-renowned expert in mixed jurisdictions, sheds light on the
seminal work of the translators who were involved in the first major
translation effort in the state, translating the Louisiana’s first civil
code, the Digest of the Civil Laws Now in force in the Territory of
Orleans of 1808, from French into English. This instrument was key
to settle the dispute whether the Territory would remain a civil-law
or common-law jurisdiction after the purchase by the United States
in 1803. This civil code anchored the state in the civil-law tradition,
which was reinforced in the wholesale revisions of 1825 and 1870
and the piecemeal amendments in more recent years.
The identity and method of work of those translators had remained invisible1 so far. This book solves a “200-year-old mystery”2
by revealing the translator’s identities and biographies, putting them
in the spotlight, for good and for bad. After Palmer’s painstaking
research, their names can now be written in black and white: Henry
Paul Nugent and Auguste Davezac de Castera.
II. STRUCTURE AND STYLE OF THE BOOK
The book is divided into five chapters and one appendix. It starts
with a literary scene depicting a trial in which the soon-to-be-revealed translators were involved, one as a defendant and the other
as counsel. Chapter two details the method followed by the author
to discover the identities and biographies of the translators. Chapter

1. Invisibility in translation is a recurring topic in translation studies, and the
fundamental work in the area is LAWRENCE VENUTI, THE TRANSLATOR’S
INVISIBILITY: A HISTORY OF TRANSLATION (Routledge 2008).
2. See https://perma.cc/Y98H-XLJM.
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three and four tell the stories of the translators, a “mercurial man”3
and an “eloquent docteur.”4 Between chapter four and five there are
some portraits of relevant characters to this research, among which
we can see that of Davezac; alas, there is no portrait of Nugent. The
translation is put in context in chapter five, which engages in a critical analysis of the translation approach and strategy. As a corollary,
the appendix contains selected writings by the translators, who had
a somehow prominent public life.
A special comment is due regarding the general style in which
the book has been crafted—Professor Palmer writes with eloquence
and a literary flavor. The story of the translators starts with a scene
in medias res, a technical literary technique Palmer masters, and
continues with a very natural flow throughout the rest of the book.
The effort by the author to always choose the right word is easily
noticeable, and commendable.
II. TWO UNCONVENTIONAL TRANSLATORS
The names have been finally revealed: the Digest of 1808 was
translated by Henry Paul Nugent and Auguste Davezac de Castera.
Palmer’s initial scene depicts a libel trial followed against Nugent
for his writings against a judge. Nugent, in turn, was represented by
his co-translator Davezac. The trial was presided by another prominent legal translator: François-Xavier Martin. Palmer’s feeling is
that at that trial there was more at stake than mere libel allegations—
this trial was opposing competing French-into-English translators.5
The search for the identities of the lost translators took the author
to the Legislature’s acts authorizing payments to those involved in
the drafting and translation of the Digest. He discovered their

3. VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THE LOST TRANSLATORS OF 1808 AND THE
BIRTH OF CIVIL LAW IN LOUISIANA 12 (Univ. Georgia Press 2021).
4. Id. at 20.
5. The rivalry may date back to the times when Nugent fiercely criticized
Martin’s translation of Pothier. See PALMER, supra note 3, at 33 (referring to Martin’s “imbecility exhibited in his burlesque translation of Pothier”).
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identities through “deduction, extrinsic evidence, and a process of
elimination.”6
Henry Paul Nugent was a self-proclaimed polyglot born in Ireland who immigrated into the United States after receiving his education in France and England;7 he also presented himself as a dancer
and a dance teacher.8 Aguste Davezac de Castera was a Frenchman
born into a Saint-Domingue family; he immigrated to the United
States and trained and practiced as a doctor in North Carolina before
settling in New Orleans.9 By reading his writings, Palmer highlights
how persnickety Nugent was in the use of language, both French
and English;10 he was what today is termed a snoot.11 Davezac also
read law in Edward Livingston’s office,12 who was his brother-inlaw. The author also mentions Davezac’s profuse experience translating books from French into English.13 Both Nugent and Davezac
were registered with the Superior Court in New Orleans as sworn
translators and interpreters. At a time when there was no formal
training in translation or interpretation, being in that roster could be
considered tantamount to being professional. In addition to relying
on archives and statutes where their names appear, the author draws
the big picture of the connections among these two persons and the
legal élite of their times. Palmer has found family, professional, political, and business bonds that tie the two men to the translation, as
6. Id. at 13.
7. Id. at 14.
8. Id. at 20.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 32 (where an extract is transcribed of a writing by Nugent chastising an actor for his poor pronunciation of English terms).
11. David Foster Wallace, Authority and American Usage, in CONSIDER THE
LOBSTER AND OTHER ESSAYS 69-70 (Little, Brown and Company 2005):
There are lots of epithets for people like this — Grammar Nazis, Usage
Nerds, Syntax Snobs, the Grammar Battalion, the Language Police. The
term I was raised with is SNOOT. . . . A SNOOT can be loosely defined
as somebody who knows what dysphemism means and doesn’t mind letting you know it.
I submit that we SNOOTs are just about the last remaining kind of truly
elitist nerd.
12. PALMER, supra note 3 at 15.
13. Id. at 16.
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their name is nowhere to be expressly found as translators of the
Digest.14
III. THE TRANSLATION UNDER SCRUTINY
While the greatest contribution of this book is the unveiling of
the identities of the translators of the Digest of 1808 through historical research using primary sources, chapter five on the quality of
the translation is equally important. In this part of the book, Palmer
engages in translation criticism.
As soon as the translation was out, it was criticized as “extremely incorrect” by Governor W. C. C. Clairborne.15 Officials
even thought of getting rid of the English version and keeping the
French only. However, no legislative action was taken. Then, the
issue became a contested matter in the courts. While judges were
reticent to giving prevalence to one version over the other, they
eventually established a sensible “French-preference rule.”16
The quality of the French-into-English translation of the Digest
and the subsequent codes has been a matter that garnished attention
from scholars.17 The most important contribution so far is perhaps
the analysis carried out by Professor Joseph Dainow in 1972.18
However, Palmer’s contribution in this respect goes beyond
14. While Palmer supposes that the names of the translators did not appear as
such because their product proved to be not as good as expected, another explanation could be that they were kept in the shadows because of a sustained and
widespread practice of invisibilizing translators and their work. Especially when
it comes to the translation of legislation, some people may fear that recognizing
the people who actually were involved in translating would affect the image of
the text as the solemn expression of the Legislature, particularly when the text is
supposed to be on an equal standing with the original. Hiding the translators’
names may have been a strategy to depersonalize the English text.
15. Id. at 46.
16. Id. at 47.
17. See, e.g., E. B. Dubuisson, Errors of Translation in the Codes, 5 LOY.
L.J. 163 (1924); John M. Shuey, Civil Codes—Control of the French Text of the
Code of 1825, 3 LA. L. REV. 452 (1941).
18. 1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA (Joseph
Dainow ed., volumes 16-17 of West’s Louisiana Statutes Annotated, 1973)
(1940). For more information on the compiled edition, see Jaro Mayda, Book Review, 34 LA. L. REV. 152 (1973).
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criticizing errors. As a mixed-jurisdictions scholar, he succeeds in
taking a deeper look at the general approach and specific strategies
adopted by the chastised translators. He found a deliberate attempt
by the translators to introduce common-law equivalents. Aware of
their role in a developing jurisdiction with an influx of lawyers
trained in the common law only, the translators knew that they had
to do something else than merely translate to convey the message.
Also, the author’s analysis revealed a very questionable practice in
how these translators worked: they divided their work in parts and
each did his share, without consulting each other and comparing
their versions. Though undesirable in principle, time constraints
may require dividing large documents for translation among two or
more translators,19 especially in legal contexts.20 However, a basic
good practice to ensure the quality of the final product is that (a) the
translators involved work together and agree on translation solutions
and style, and/or (b) that a third-party reviser goes through the entire
document to polish any discrepancies and makes the text look as if
it had been written by a single person.21 Palmer’s analysis reveals
that none of these courses of action were followed. Evidence of the
translators’ method of work is the translation of the French term
fruits civils as civil profits in some sections, and as civil fruits in

19. This practice is referred to as “batch translation” in DANIEL GOUADEC,
TRANSLATION AS A PROFESSION 107 (John Benjamins Publ’g 2007).
20. See Fernando Prieto Ramos, Quality Assurance in Legal Translation:
Evaluating Process, Competence and Product in the Pursuit of Adequacy, 28 INT.
J. SEMIOT. L. 11-30 (2015).
21. See GOUADEC, supra note 19, at 107 (explaining that:
Parallel or simultaneous translation means the different translators translate their respective batches in the same time interval. The main problem
is terminological, phraseological and stylistic consistency between the
different batches. This can be achieved upstream by making sure the resources or raw materials (terminology, phraseology, models, and memories) are made available to all the translators and validated and harmonized before the translation starts. It can be achieved downstream by harmonizing the translations during the proof-reading process. It is essential
in any case that all the translators concerned be duly advised that other
translators are working on different batches of the same job. (emphasis
in the original)).
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others.22 The author attributes the inconsistency in the quality and
style of the translation to the lack of collaboration between the two
translators.23
Palmer goes over the famous Batiza-Pascal debate24 only to
highlight how little attention had been paid to the English translation
of the 1808 Digest. At this point, his research not only sheds light
on the identities of the translators, but also on the sources they used
to translate the civil law into English. Among these sources, two
merit an express mention: an old English translation of Domat’s Les
Loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel and Blackstone’s Commentaries
on the Laws of England. Blackstone’s presence in the Digest revealed the efforts made by the translators to convey a new body of
law with language that was familiar to the common-law-trained professionals present in Louisiana at the turn of the 19th century. The
author makes clear that these decisions were most probably taken by
the translators themselves, without what is known in modern translation studies as a “translation brief,”25 i.e., instructions from the
commissioner of the translation job (in this case, most likely the
Legislature). Anyway, they took it upon themselves to “communicate in the language best understood by the anglophone bench and
bar.”26 Palmer gives the translators credit where credit is due: the
1808 translation is portrayed as an “uncatalogued creation,”27 which
served to “accommodate, reconcile, or bridge legal differences and
to overcome communication gaps between the traditions.”28 In
22. See PALMER, supra note 3, at 66.
23. See Wallace, supra note 11, at 69-70.
24. See Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources
and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1971-1972); see also Robert Pascal,
Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603
(1972). In short, Batiza advocated the theory that most of the sources of the Digest
were French in origin, while Pascal held that they were Spanish.
25. See generally Juliette Scott, Specifying Levels of (C)overtness in Legal
Translation Briefs, in LEGAL TRANSLATION. CURRENT ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
IN RESEARCH, METHODS AND APPLICATIONS (Ingrid Simonnæs & Marita Kristiansen eds., Frank & Timme 2019).
26. PALMER, supra note 3, at 52.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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translation-theory terms, Nugent and Davezac had in mind a purpose
or skopos29 that shaped the translation strategies for their work.
Palmer takes a compassionate approach on how the translators
used the common law to find “equivalents for the benefit of an anglophone legal audience.”30 A purist could say that this approach is
flawed because the language of the civil law should be conveyed in
civilian terms only.31 Also, some could even allege that by introducing common-law terms the translators lost the opportunity to lay
solid foundations for the language of the civil law in English. Let us
remember that the Digest of 1808 was the first modern, Europeanstyle civil code in English. A balanced approach requires accepting
that sometimes it is beneficial for the purpose of the translation to
use common-law terminology.32 Using the common law in those
cases takes the text (or author) closer to the reader, and not the other
way around.33
29. Hans J. Vermeer’s “skopos theory” explains the translating activity by
parting from the view that translation is a form of human interaction and, as such,
determined by its purpose or “skopos.” See Christiane Nord, A Functional Typology of Translations, in TEXT TYPOLOGY AND TRANSLATION (Anna Trosborg ed.,
John Benjamins Publ’g 1997) (“One of the main factors in the skopos of a communicative activity is the (intended) receiver or addressee with their specific communicative needs.”).
30. PALMER, supra note 3, at 53.
31. See, e.g., Alain Levasseur & Vicenç Feliú, The English Fox in the Louisiana Civil Law Chausse-Trappe: Civil Law Concepts in the English Language;
Comparativists Beware, 69 LA. L. REV. 715 (2009) and John Randall Trahan, Levasseur, Legal Linguist, 76 LA. L. REV. 1025 (2016).
32. The author of this review believes that resorting to common-law language
to translate the civil law is appropriate mostly for informative purposes. For example, if a lawyer in New York needs a contract translated from Spanish into
English to understand whether a lease is part of a merger transaction he is working
on, it is likely that the lawyer will not understand if the translation uses civilian
English, unless the lawyer is specifically trained in or is generally aware of the
civil law. See, e.g., Ejan Mackaay, La traduction du nouveau code civil néerlandais en anglais et en français, in JURILINGUISTIQUE : ENTRE LANGUES ET
DROIT/JURILINGUISTICS: BETWEEN LAW AND LANGUAGE (Jean-Claude Gémar &
Nicholas Kasirer eds., Bruylant & Éditions Thémis 2005) [hereinafter
JURILINGUISTICS: LAW AND LANGUAGE] (explaining how a translation of the
Dutch Civil Code done using strictly civilian terminology had to be adapted with
common-law terms due to pressure from legal practitioners who complained
about the understandability of the original translation).
33. Schleiermacher is to be credited for differentiating between two methods:
the translator leaves the author in peace, as much as possible, and moves the reader
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Palmer presents the dichotomy between translating using civilian language and common-law language as a clash between “literal
translation” and “legal transposition.” The common-law terminology referred to by Palmer includes attorney in fact, chattels, consideration, joint and several obligation, loan on bottomry, parol evidence, sales by cant, separation from bed and board, and landlord.34
What the author calls “transposition” is typically known as translating in one legal system by using “equivalents” from another system.
He shows that this translation practice was applied in Louisiana even
before the Digest of 1808.35
Scholars studying the legal system of Louisiana have pointed out
that there has been a pedagogic purpose in mind in the early codes,
especially in the 1825 code.36 This is in stark contrast with the Code
Napoléon, which made the case for concise and cut-to-the-chase legislation to be understood by all. Palmer argues that while the Digest
of 1808 was not intended to be such a pedagogical tool, the translation was. In translation-theory language, the skopos37 of the translation was to educate the rising legal community in Louisiana. Palmer
accurately exemplifies this approach by analyzing the translation
strategy used by Nugent and Davezac in translating headings. Because the translators were probably afraid that their audience would
not understand if they translated civilian language transparently,
they oftentimes resorted to the strategy of using doublets. This is
how “Des obligations solidaires” became “Of Obligations In Solido
or Jointly and Severally,”38 for example. At the time of the
toward him; or he leaves the reader in peace, as much as possible, and moves the
author toward him. See VENUTI, supra note 1, at 20. See generally, FRIEDRICH
SCHLEIERMACHER, SOBRE LOS DIFERENTES MODOS DE TRADUCIR (Valentín García
Yebra trans., Gredos 2000).
34. PALMER, supra note 3, at 53-54.
35. Id. at 54 (explaining that the Legislature acts of 1804–1808 had already
adopted this approach).
36. Id. at 55.
37. See Batiza, supra note 29 and Pascal, supra note 29; see also PALMER,
supra note 3, at 55. Palmer calls this an “independent educational or pedagogic
purpose.”
38. PALMER, supra note 3, at 56.
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translation, when the language of the civil law was not widely disseminated in English, the translators probably believed that solidary
obligations would not do the trick, as the term would sound arcane
to Louisiana practitioners and judges. That might have been why
they resorted to a doublet, using a Latin term (in solido) and a common-law equivalent (joint and several), which more or less reflected
the same idea as the original.
While Nugent and Davezac clearly made an effort to reach the
Anglophone legal audience of the time, they also lost some opportunities to establish and consolidate the language of the civil law.
After all, their translation was not for informative purposes only, as
could be the case with the translation of a civil code for academic
purposes. Their translation was intended to be, and actually was, at
an equal footing with the original French text. In drafting an official
text, they were entitled to resort to the strategy of creating neologisms when neologisms were needed, as they were writing a text
that was not only supposed to convey what the law said, but to be
the law itself.
Nevertheless, the translation approach was not unsupported by
facts, as it is true that the emerging legal community of Louisiana in
general was mostly ignorant of the civil law and its codification in
the state. Right after the Louisiana Purchase, the influx of commonlaw lawyers from other parts of the United States grew dramatically,
to the point that in the 1803–1805 period 56% of lawyers were Anglophone Americans, and the Francophones only accounted for 37%
of the bar.39
Palmer’s general analysis of the translation is followed by an
analysis of specific choices by the translators. He recognizes their
great share of responsibility in shaping the language of the civil law
in English in Louisiana. They coined part of the language which
would be used for years to come. One of these examples, for which
the author praises the translators, is the use of the obligee-obligor
39. Id. at 58.
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pair. Palmer says that this terminology is a “notable invention.”40
This choice by the translators, however, can be criticized on many
counts.
The author concedes that the terms were “obscure and musty
English law terms that were rarely used even in common-law
books,”41 adding that the usage seemed to be confined to the law of
English bonds.42 The translators used obligee-obligor only in five
articles, and they used creditor-debtor in the rest. The author attributes this hesitance to the inexperienced translators, who were dealing with terminology they did not master, and posits that whenever
the translators used the new terminology “they applied it precisely
backward and mistakenly, thus producing legal nonsense.”43 Then
he offers six examples in which these terms or one of its derivations
(i.e., co-obligee) are used to convey a meaning opposite the meaning
now in use. For example, article 42 used obligee as a translation of
débiteur and article 44 used obligor as a translation for créancier.
These mistakes cannot be lightly attributed to the ignorance of
the translators. They might have been baffled by these arcane terms,
but also the legal community these days finds this terminology farfetched.44 The source of confusion may be that the ending -or in legal English usually designates the active party in a transaction, and
the ending -ee is used for the passive party: a lessor is the one who
gives a lease over a piece of property to another, called the lessee,
who takes the property and undertakes to pay the lease price; a
promisor is the one who makes a promise to another called
40. Id. at 61.
41. Id.
42. Cf. MARTIN HOGG, OBLIGATIONS. LAW AND LANGUAGE 56 (Cambridge
2017) (asserting that John Cowell, in his Institutes of the Lawes of England, written in 1651, already referred to the party burdened with the duty as the “debtor”
or “obligor.” Hogg makes it clear that Cowell was writing within a “consciously
civilian framework”).
43. Id. at 62.
44. Bryan Garner, a leading authority on legal English, believes that “the wisest policy is probably not to handle [these terms] at all.” Obligee; obligor, BRYAN
A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (2d ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 2001).
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promisee, who is entitled to enforce the promise against the first one;
the bailor is the one who gives personal property to another called
bailee, so that the bailee has the obligation to take care of the item
and return it upon bailor’s request. In the obligor-obligee pair, one
is tempted to say that the person who is obligated to the undertaking
is the obligee, because it sounds like the passive party in the transaction, just like the lessee receives the property and pays the lease
price or the bailee receives the item from the bailor. But in Louisiana
law—and in current legal parlance in general—the obligee is the
party to whom the performance is owed. The obligor, then, is the
party obligated to perform. What led the translators to use the terminology in the opposite direction as compared to how is used nowadays in Louisiana and some other jurisdictions, including commonlaw jurisdictions, could be the archaic use of that terminology.
Black’s Law Dictionary recognizes that an archaic use of obligee is
“someone who is obliged to do something.”45 The same dictionary,
in turn, defines obligor (with an “archaic” mark) as “someone who
obliges another to do something.”46
Palmer explains that the modern Louisianan sense of the terms
obligee-obligor consolidated after Louis Moreau-Lislet and Henry
Carleton used them in translating Las Siete Partidas and the translators of the 1825 Code extended the application of those terms to
twenty-three provisions. In both of these cases, obligee was used to
translate créancier and obligor to translate débiteur. While Palmer
holds that now the terminology is commonplace in civilian parlance,
it is hard to accept that it is one of the “civil law’s most useful
45. Obligee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The dictionary also
includes this explanatory warning:
Several dictionaries, such as The Random House College Dictionary
(rev. ed. 1995) and Webster’s New World Dictionary (4th ed. 2007), define obligee in its etymological sense [‘obliged’], as if it were synonymous with obligor. Random House, for example, defines obligee as ‘a
person who is obligated to another,’ but that meaning ought to be reserved for obligor. An obligee, in modern usage, is one to whom an obligation is owed. Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage
624 (3d ed. 2011).
46. Id.
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expressions,”47 as the terms still cause a lot of trouble nowadays.48
A different, clearer terminology would have been and is possible
and desirable. As a matter of fact, other civil codes in English use
the more transparent creditor-debtor pair.49 In addition to being
plain, this terminology has the added value of being in line with the
language of obligations in other tongues.50
Criticizing this translation, it needs to be said, is a risky endeavor, as the analysis must take into account usages that were valid
back in the early 1800s and that may no longer be valid these days.
In general, Palmer does an excellent job as a critic, but some of the
cases for which he whips the translators are at least debatable. One
of these slippery cases is the translation of animaux as cattle. Palmer
is categorical in his judgment of this translation:
Inexplicably, the simple word animaux (animals) proved to
be a bête noir. It was systematically translated as ‘cattle,’ a
mistake that automatically altered the intended scope of the
provision in question. . . . The substitution of the word ‘cattle’ for ‘animals,’ . . . reduced the entire animal kingdom to
a single bovine genus and thereby narrowed coverage obviously intended to be wider.51
While at first sight it may seem that Nugent and Davezac incurred the mistake of overtranslation by using a type of animal as
the hypernym, Palmer then concedes in a footnote52 that the translators may have used the word adopting “an obsolete meaning that
was once current centuries earlier.” The explanation of the term in
the Oxford English Dictionary indicates that, after an identification
with personal property during feudalism, the term was increasingly

47. PALMER, supra note 3, at 64.
48. See GARNER, supra note 44.
49. Such as the Civil Code of Quebec in English and the Civil Code of Goa,
India. The Civil Code of the Philippines uses both creditor-debtor and obligeeobligor.
50. In Spanish, acreedor-deudor; in Italian, creditore-debitore; in Portuguese
credor-devedor. And, of course, créancier-débiteur in French.
51. PALMER, supra note 3, at 70
52. Id. at 70 n. 83.
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used as “live stock” in English.53 The dictionary provides even more
support to the translators’ choice:
II. Live stock. . . . 4.a. A collective name for live animals
held as property, or reared to serve as food, or for the sake
of their milk, skin, wool, etc. The application of the term has
varied greatly, according to the circumstances of time and
place, and has included camels, horses, asses, mules, oxen,
cows, calves, sheep, lambs, goats swine, etc. The tendency
in recent times has been to restrict the term to the bovine
genus, but the wider meaning is still found locally, and in
many combinations.54
In light of this background, it is hard to believe that the translators made such a gross mistake. Writing in the early 1800s, the use
of cattle as live stock in general might have been familiar to the readers of that time.55
Another great contribution of this book is the unveiling of a
“third translator.” This is how Palmer refers to the translators resorting to William Strahan’s translation into English of Les Loix civiles
dans leur ordre naturel, originally written in French by Jean Domat.
Just as the codifiers borrowed from Domat to write the Digest,56
Palmer discovered that the translators took a “labor-saving
shortcut”57 as they copied verbatim from Strahan’s translation.
While Palmer suggests that the translators could have provided their
own version instead of just copycatting the English translator, it is a
standard practice in translation to stick to authoritative sources.
53. Cattle, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (“Under the feudal
system the application was confined to movable property or wealth, as being the
only ‘personal’ property, and in English it was more and more identified with
‘beast held in possession, live stock’, which was almost the only use after 1500.”).
54. Id.
55. A good argument in favor of the view of this translation as a mistake
would be the finding of cases decided around that time in which the meaning of
the term was disputed. If that term was mistranslated, as Palmer suggests, there
must have been cases in which the dispute cropped up.
56. See, for the original study, Rodolfo Batiza, Louisiana Civil Code of 1808:
Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1972); to go deeper
into Batiza’s argument, see Seth S. Brostoff, The Encyclopedist Code: Ancien
Droit Legal Encyclopedias and Their Verbatim Influence on the Louisiana Digest
of 1808, 13 J. CIV. L. STUD. 33 (2020).
57. PALMER, supra note 3, at 70.
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Conversely, attention could be directed at praising the translators for
doing their research and resorting to a translation that was very well
accepted in the legal community. As a matter of fact, a translator is
supposed to concede to previous translations if the quality of the
translations is good and enjoys acceptance among the relevant community. However, Palmer hits the nail on the head when criticizing
the translators for being led to use strange collocations that are traceable to Strahan, such as knavish possessor for possesseur de mauvaise foi and honest and fair possessor for possesseur de bonne foi.
Possessor in bad faith and possessor in good faith would have certainly been better and plainer equivalents. Palmer is right in criticizing the “slavish reliance”58 on Strahan’s translation as for these
weird terms.
The use of Strahan’s translation by Nugent and Davezac leads
Palmer to speculate on how the translators interacted with the redactors of the Digest. The main redactor, Moreau-Lislet, was categorical in setting himself apart from the translation: “We have nothing
to do with the imperfections of the translation of the Code—the
French text, in which it is known that the work was drawn up, leaves
no doubt.”59 While that was the position pour la galerie, Palmer
suggests that the translators and redactors were in contact,60 because
otherwise the translators would not have known that extracts of the
Digest had been taken verbatim from Domat, which was translated
by Strahan. Another possibility could be that the translators discovered Strahan by their own means, but Palmer’s intuition seems to be
more accurate, in light of the translators’ lack of sound legal credentials.61 Discovering sources and contrasting originals with translations certainly requires legal and translation skills. Nowadays, it has
58. Id. at 71.
59. Id. at 75.
60. Id.
61. Looking at Moreau-Lislet’s library may be a good idea; see Agustín
Parise, A Translator’s Toolbox: The Law, Moreau-Lislet’s Library, and the Presence of Multilingual Dictionaries in Nineteenth-Century Louisiana, 76 LA. L.
REV. 1163 (2016).
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been understood that collaboration between authors and translators
is of the essence to attain optimal results. Especially in the area of
legislative translation with the purpose of creating translations
which actually are originals, the modern technique of co-drafting is
the way to go to guarantee the best product.62
IV. CONCLUSION
Palmer’s analysis has unearthed many interesting facts to understand how the law of Louisiana has been shaped since the drafting
and translation of a seminal piece of legislation which afterward, in
1870, became the monolingual English code. The translators were
responsible for many of the linguistic choices that shaped the civil
law in Louisiana for years to come. However, it is difficult to accept
that the civil law was born with this translation as the title of the
book suggests or that the civil law was “implanted”63 with this translation, as Louisiana was already “deeply rooted in the civil law tradition”64 before the enactment of the Digest in 1808. But Palmer is
right in pointing that this translation “represented a consequential
step in the birth of a distinct kind of civil law in Louisiana.”65 After
all, Nugent and Davezac might have been the first cooks behind
Louisiana’s “legal gumbo.”66
This book was very much needed to understand the origins of
codified civil law in the state of Louisiana. It is a great contribution
combining legal history, comparative law, and legal translation. The
view of an expert in mixed jurisdictions was key to put this translation in perspective as a “unique artifact of Louisiana’s mixed legal
62. See, e.g., Susan Šarčević, The Quest for Legislative Bilingualism and
Multilingualism: Co-Drafting in Canada and Switzerland, in JURILINGUISTICS:
LAW AND LANGUAGE, supra note 32, at 279-292.
63. PALMER, supra note 3, at 81.
64. Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: Archaic
or Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century, 63 LA. L. REV. 4 (2002).
65. Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
66. Olivier Moréteau, Mare Nostrum as the Cauldron of Western Legal Traditions: Stirring the Broth, Making Sense of Legal Gumbo whilst Understanding
Contamination, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 519-520 (2011).
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system that mirrors the historical conditions of its day,”67 yet without avoiding pondering over the shortcomings of the translation. After going through the history of Nugent and Davezac and their translation, one is left with a desire for more. The legal community of
Louisiana would welcome a study like this one on the translators
and the story behind the translation of the Civil Code of 1825, which
was also drafted in French and translated into English. Professor
Palmer might want to enlighten us with a sequel, for the benefit of
all of us interested in this rich mixed jurisdiction.
Mariano Vitetta
Austral University School of Law

67. PALMER, supra note 3, at 3.

